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Abstract: We analyze the factors that influence the support for environmen-
tal policy proposals. Swiss referendum data show that proposals obtain more
yes-votes if they do not restrict consumption possibilities directly, if they are
endorsed by business associations, if environmental preferences are strong and
economic conditions are favorable at the time of the referendum. Also, there
are more pro-environmental votes in cantons with higher population density.
On the other hand, yes-votes do not seem to depend on whether a proposal
involves a tax or not.
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1 Introduction
Even though research on environmental policy instruments is still mostly norma-
tive, positive approaches are gaining importance. Since the seminal contribution
by Buchanan and Tullock (1975), theoretical arguments have often been used to
understand why some policy instruments are applied more often than others. In
particular, many authors have attempted to explain why market instruments have
been used less frequently than command-and-control regulation.1 In addition, some
papers deal with the conditions fostering the introduction of environmental policy
in general, and green taxes in particular.2
Even though the positive theory of environmental policy dates back to the nine-
teen seventies, empirical work is scarce. Only a small number of papers analyzes
voting behavior in environmental ballots (Fischel 1979, Deacon and Shapiro 1975,
Kahn and Matsusaka 1997, Thalmann 2004).3
Like these authors, we use referendum data to analyze which factors increase
the electoral support for environmental policy in a direct democracy. We consider
45 environmental referenda that took place in Switzerland between 1977 and 2003.
About half of these concerned transportation issues; the others dealt with energy
policy, landscape conservation and agriculture. We start from the following set of
hypotheses.
(H1) The smaller the negative eﬀects of a proposal on individual consumption pos-
sibilities, the more yes-votes it will receive.
(H2) Proposals that tax consumers receive less yes-votes than proposals that pro-
hibit certain consumption activities.
(H3) The higher the share of voters with strong pro-environmental preferences at
the time when a decision on a proposal was made, the more yes-votes it will
receive.
(H4) The better the economic conditions at the time when a decision on a proposal
was made, the more yes-votes it will receive.
1Examples include Dewees (1983), Hahn (1990), Hahn and Noll (1990), Frey and Schneider
(1997). Dijkstra (1999) and Keohane et al. (2000) survey the literature.
2See for instance Hahn (1990), Fredriksson (1997) and Polk and Schmutzler (2005).
3Some authors have used questionnaires or casual empiricism to find out the preferences of
diﬀerent groups with respect to abstract policy instruments. Examples include Dijkstra (1999),
Svendsen (1999), Verhoef (1996), Wallart and Bürgenmeier (1996).
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(H5) The greater the positive eﬀects of a proposal on the environment, the more
yes-votes it will receive.
In the working paper (Halbheer et al. 2003), we derive most of these hypotheses
from a simple formal model where voters consider the costs and benefits of policies,
but as the hypotheses are suﬃciently intuitive, we refrain from such a derivation in
this paper. (H1), (H3) and (H5) are the most direct reflections of the idea that voters
consider costs and benefits of a proposal. (H4) requires an additional normality
assumption on environmental goods. (H2) is suggested by the widespread idea
that command-and control regulation has more political support than environmental
taxes.4
We test (H1)-(H4) by relating the percentage of yes-votes in a particular canton
in a particular referendum to a number of explanatory variables chosen with the
above hypotheses in mind.
As there are no simple and generally accepted techniques to measure the eﬀects
of environmental proposals on consumption, we use dummy variables to test (H1).
We distinguish between three types of costs that a voter might associate with an
environmental proposal. First, some proposals directly reduce consumer sovereignty
by making it impossible to pursue a particular consumption activity. Obvious can-
didates are driving prohibitions on certain days or proposals to abandon highway
projects.5 Second, some proposals involve tax increases. Most obviously, this is
true when a proposal contains environmental taxes. In addition, public projects
such as measures to improve railway transportation may be perceived as implying
tax increases, because they require financing.6 Third, a project might influence
consumption opportunities by aﬀecting economic conditions more generally. If an
environmental proposal is expected to inhibit economic growth, for instance, by in-
ducing relocation of industries to other countries, it is less likely to be accepted,
other things being equal. To identify such proposals, we use the oﬃcial voting rec-
ommendations of business associations: When the national association of businesses
does not endorse a project, we take this as a negative sign for the overall economic
impact. Summing up, our empirical model distinguishes between three diﬀerent
4Note, however, that this idea is usally derived in the context of environmental pollution by
firms rather than consumers.
5In this dimension, some environmental proposals also have a positive direct eﬀect. Specifically,
proposals to increase public transport introduce new consumption options.
6By the same token, if a proposal calls for a reduction of public spending on projects with
negative environmental eﬀects such as motorways, it should be associated with lower taxes.
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types of cost variables: Consumer sovereignty dummies capturing direct restric-
tions on consumer choice, tax dummies and a general economic impact dummy.
This dummy approach also allows us to test (H2), which suggests that, other things
equal, taxation should have stronger negative eﬀects on pro-environmental votes
than a restriction of consumer sovereignty.
We approach (H3) by including a variable measuring the importance that society
puts on environmental problems. This variable can be obtained from a yearly survey
in which Swiss citizens are asked which political issues they consider as important.
Finally, to test (H4), we use the temporal and regional variation in economic growth
and unemployment.
As we have not been able to construct a meaningful variable to measure the
impact of a proposal on the environment, we make no attempt to test (H5) directly.
However, we can obtain at least some evidence on the relation between environmen-
tal eﬀects and yes-votes by exploiting the variation in cantonal population density.
A higher population density is likely to correspond to greater environmental prob-
lems, which suggests that the potential benefits of environmental improvements in
such areas are perceived as particularly high. We should thus expect more yes-
votes in densely populated areas. However, such a relation might also reflect higher
economic costs of environmental measures in rural areas. In particular, the adverse
aﬀects of restrictive policies towards private road transportation are likely to be per-
ceived as higher by the inhabitants of rural areas than by city residents. Either way,
cost-benefit considerations would suggest more pro-environmental votes in densely
populated areas.
The main results of our empirical analysis are as follows. First, the consumer
sovereignty variables have strong and highly significant eﬀects on the percentage of
yes-votes. This suggests that proposals involving no direct restriction on consumer
sovereignty have much better chances of being accepted than measures that restrict
choices. Second, projects with positive “general economic impact” receive more yes-
votes. Third, in times when environmental problems are considered to be important,
environmental proposals meet with high support. In this sense, stated preferences
correspond to those revealed through voting behavior in the ballots. Fourth, regional
diﬀerences in voting behavior are closely related to characteristics that would sug-
gest diﬀerences in preferences for the environment: Population density has a highly
significant positive eﬀect on acceptance chances.
Our approach diﬀers from the above-mentioned empirical literature in several
ways. For instance, Kahn and Matsusaka (1997) study 16 ballots in California.
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However, unlike our study, they do not deal with the eﬀects of properties of the
proposal on its acceptance chances. Instead, they are mainly concerned with the
eﬀects of voter characteristics on their behavior. Like our approach, however, they
start from the idea that individuals weigh the costs and benefits when they decide
on environmental proposals.7
Thalmann (2004) deals with three energy-tax referenda that took place in Switzer-
land in September 2000.8 Like Kahn and Matsusaka, Thalmann focusses on the
relation between voter characteristics and their behavior in the ballots, though he
also asks how characteristics of the proposal such as the type of revenue recycling
influence voter behavior. In contrast to Thalmann, our study is silent about the
eﬀects of voter characteristics on their behavior. However, because of the relatively
large number of diﬀerent proposals in our sample, we can say more about the re-
lationship between the characteristics of the proposal and the electoral support it
receives.
Our analysis is also related to a study by Vatter et al. (2000) who analyzes voter
behavior in 27 Swiss referenda on transportation issues. Most of these referenda are
included in our data set. However, our analysis diﬀers in several respects. First,
we deleted some transportation proposals without direct environmental repercus-
sions. Second, we added referenda on environmental issues not directly related to
transportation (energy policy, landscape preservation and agriculture). Third, most
importantly, our approach is motivated by economic analysis. We attempt to rely
exclusively on variables that relate directly to the contents of the proposal or to
environmental preferences and the state of the economy at the time of the refer-
endum. In contrast, Vatter et al. come from a political science perspective. Their
explanatory variables and hence their results have very little in common with the
ones we use.9
Our approach of employing a linear model to understand which factors increase
the percentage of yes-votes of some environmental proposal may seem unusual. The
potential diﬃculty arises from the fact that we face the potential problem that
this model can give a percentage of yes-votes outside the interval [0, 100]. How-
ever, we will substantiate below that this problem is not severe under the specific
circumstances. Other authors who study voting behavior in environmental ballots
7The study uses heterogeneity of the population accross 57 counties to estimate the eﬀects of
income and of the opportunity costs of of environmental proposals on voting behavior.
8These referenda are also in our data set.
9They concern the amount of support by various population groups, the legal status of the
proposal, etc.
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employ binary-choice models.10 Such binary-choice models are particularly appropri-
ate when individual data are used to understand how voter characteristics influence
voter behavior, while we use aggregate data to understand how characteristics of
proposals influence the support they receive instead.11
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the econometric model.
Section 3 describes the data. In Section 4, we give some descriptive statistics. In
Section 5, we present the regression results. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Econometric Approach
We use the following model to test (H1)-(H4). We assume that the percentage of
yes-votes of some environmental proposal depends on a set of control variables and
an unobservable error. Further, we assume that the model is linear in parameters
and that the error has mean zero and is uncorrelated with each of the control vari-
ables. With the above hypothesis in mind, we partition the control variables in cost
variables, variables representing environmental preferences and covariates reflecting
the economic conditions. We further introduce other variables capturing cantonal
heterogeneity and a peculiarity of the Swiss voting system. Though we consider
only national referenda, we employ data on votes at the cantonal level for each
referendum.
2.1 Cost Variables
We introduce consumer sovereignty dummies, tax dummies and a general economic
impact dummy to reflect the costs of a proposal.
Consumer Sovereignty Dummies. We distinguish between three types of propos-
als. First, there are proposals that restrict particular types of consumption activities
directly (for instance, by prohibiting to drive on certain days or by abandoning par-
ticular highway projects). Second, there are “neutral” proposals that do not directly
restrict any particular consumption activity (such as a moratorium on nuclear power
10For instance, the above-mentioned studies on environmental ballots by Kahn and Matsusaka
(1997) and Thalmann (2004) use logit models. The same is true for papers dealing with referenda
on non-environmental issues (e.g., Schulze and Ursprung 2000).
11Alternatively, we could have modeled the outcome of the vote as a random variable that takes
value 1 if the proposal is accepted and 0 if the proposal is rejected to examine the factors that
aﬀect the acceptance probability. However, this would involve ignoring valuable information on
the fraction of voters who accept a proposal.
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or a general program to support energy eﬃciency).12 Third, there are proposals that
involve an extension of certain consumption activities (such as public transport).
To distinguish between these three possibilities, we introduce two consumer sov-
ereignty dummies. The first dummy, CS0, takes on a value of 1 if the proposal is
neutral with respect to consumption possibilities, whereas the second dummy, CS+,
takes on a value of 1 if the proposal extends consumption possibilities.
Tax Dummies. Again, we distinguish between three classes of proposals. First,
there are proposals that we associate with higher taxes. Some of these proposals
contain taxes on certain activities carried out by typical voters (highway usage, en-
ergy consumption). The remaining proposals in this group involve public projects
which have to be financed in some fashion, for instance via tax increases. Second, we
classified some proposals as tax-neutral. Obvious examples include driving restric-
tions on certain days or restrictions on landscape usage. Third, some environmental
proposals tend to reduce the need for taxes. If the proposal is: “Do not build a
motorway from A to B”, tax payers’ money is saved.13 To distinguish between the
three types of proposals, we introduce two dummy variables: TAX0 takes on a value
of 1 if a proposal is neutral with respect to taxation, TAX+ takes on a value of 1 if
a proposal is associated with lower taxes.14
General Economic Impact Dummy. To measure the general economic impact of a
proposal, we use the recommendation given by economiesuisse, the largest business
association in Switzerland.15 If the association supports a proposal, we take this
as a sign of a positive economic impact.16 Thus, we include a dummy BS, where
BS = 1 indicates that the project is backed by economiesuisse.
2.2 Environmental Preferences and Economic Parameters
To account for environmental preferences and for the economic conditions at the
time of the referendum we introduce further variables.
12Obviously, such proposals can have indirect eﬀects (e.g., by making energy more expensive).
These eﬀects will be captured by the general economic impact dummy below.
13Obviously, we are talking about the direct eﬀects here. Possible detrimental eﬀects on economic
activity that may reduce tax revenue in the long run are captured by the general economic impact
dummy instead.
14The logic of the notation TAX+ corresponds to the earlier notation CS+: In both cases, a
value of 1 reflects a positive eﬀect on consumers.
15economiesuisse is the result of a merger of Vorort and wf and has the support of more than
30,000 businesses of all sizes, employing a total of 1.5 million people in Switzerland. For the early
referenda, we use the recommendation of Vorort.
16We shall discuss this interpretation below.
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Environmental Preferences. To capture possible exogenous variation in environ-
mental preferences, we introduce a variable that describes the percentage of the
population with voting power that considers environmental problems as important.
This variable, denoted ENV , relies on a survey that is carried out annually by the
research institute GfS.17 For recent years, the results of this survey were obtained
from various issues of Sorgenbarometer, a publication by Credit Suisse.18
National Income. The growth rate of real cantonal income in the year before the
referendum is included and denoted by GROWTH.19
Unemployment. Similarly, we include the cantonal unemployment rate denoted
by UNEMP .20 ,21
There is potentially a multi-collinearity issue: As the environmental concern
might depend on economic conditions, one should worry that environmental prefer-
ences might be correlated with income and unemployment. As detailed below, in
most variants of our model (Model 2-4), we therefore consider only one or two of
the variables introduced here.
2.3 Other Variables
We finally introduce two variables to capture regional heterogeneity and a peculiarity
of the Swiss system.
Cantonal Population Density. Rather than including a cantonal dummy, we used
a more informative variable, namely the cantonal population density denoted PD,
to capture regional eﬀects.22 For each canton, we fixed these variables at one level
(1997), which is justified as the temporal variation is negligible compared to the
regional variation.
17The research center GfS (Gesellschaft für Sozialforschung) is specialized in applied policy
research.
18We are grateful to Marc Bühlmann (Institute of Political Science, University of Bern) who
made available the data for the early referenda.
19To construct this series, we employ data published by the Swiss Federal Statistical Oﬃce and
the Swiss National Bank (see http://www.bfs.admin.ch and http://www.snb.ch, respectively).
Detailed information about the construction of this variable is available from the authors upon
request.
20Unemployment rates were obtained from the Confederation’s State Secretariat for Economic
Aﬀairs. See http://www.seco.admin.ch.
21A referee has suggested to use the change of the unemployment rate in the preceding period,
∆UNEMP , instead, as one might expect voting behavior to react to the perceived changes rather
than to the level. We will investigate this possibility below.
22Population density is measured by the number of inhabitants per square kilometre. The data
can be found on the oﬃcial homepage of the Federal Authorities of the Swiss Confederation. See
http://www.admin.ch.
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Main types of proposals Number
Transportation-related issues 24
Emission standards for motor vehicles 1
More restrictive planning requirements 1
Driving restrictions on Sundays 2
Support for public transport 6
Restrictions on highway-building 4
Taxes (highway usage, vehicle, mileage, gas) 8
Overall reduction of transportation 1
Speed limits 1
Energy-related issues 13
General eﬃciency standards 2
Energy taxes/subsidies for renewable energy 4
Restrictions on nuclear energy 7
Landscape Preservation and Agriculture 8
Restrictions on landscape usage 4
Support for eco-farming 3
Restrictions on genetically-modified food 1
Table 1: Breakdown of proposals by type.
The Counterproposal Dummy. Our last variable is included to account for the
legal form of the referendum. In four cases, referenda on a proposal and a — typically
more moderate — counterproposal take place on the same day. We introduced a
counterproposal dummy CP to characterize the latter kind of proposal.
3 Data
3.1 Overview
Our analysis uses data on 45 Swiss referenda on environmental issues that took
place between 1977 and 2003. The starting point of this period was determined by
data availability, and there have been no referenda that touch upon environmental
considerations since 2003. Table 1 gives an overview over the types of proposals
in our sample. 24 proposals addressed transportation issues, 13 dealt with energy
policy, and 8 concerned landscape preservation and agriculture.
Table A.1 in the appendix contains more detailed information about the sample.
The column “%Y ES” gives the percentage of yes-votes for each referendum. This
information comes from the oﬃcial homepage of the Federal Authorities of the Swiss
Confederation.
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In addition, the table shows the main explanatory variables. Except for BS, the
voting recommendations of the business associations economiesuisse and vorort,23
respectively, we had to codify the variables ourselves. For the transportation-policy
proposals, we relied heavily on information compiled by Vatter et al. In all other
cases, we used various data sources, for example, major Swiss newspapers (Neue
Zürcher Zeitung, Tages-Anzeiger) and the oﬃcial homepage of the Federal Authori-
ties of the Swiss Confederation. In the next subsection, we shall explain our choices.
The column “CS” refers to consumer sovereignty: The sign “−” corresponds to
proposals with a direct negative impact on a particular activity (CS+ = 0; CS0 = 0);
“0” corresponds to proposals with no direct impact (CS+ = 0; CS0 = 1); “+”
corresponds to proposals with a positive impact (CS+ = 1; CS0 = 0). The notation
in column “TAX” has an analogous interpretation.24 In the column “BS” (business
support), a “+” corresponds to proposals that were endorsed by economiesuisse and
its predecessors (BS = 1); a minus corresponds to proposals that were not backed. In
the column “ENV ”, we gave the value of our measure of environmental preferences
when the vote took place.
3.2 Codification Decisions
We briefly comment on our codification decisions regarding consumer sovereignty
and taxes. The variable CS was codified “−” for the following examples: (i) driving
prohibitions on Sundays, (ii) proposals to abandon specific road projects or reduce
road building in general and (iii) for restrictions on genetically modified food. The
value “0” was given to the following types of proposals: (i) measures aiming at
reduction of energy consumption in general, and nuclear energy in particular, (ii)
landscape preservation measures, (iii) general procedural proposals25 and (iv) pro-
posals that involved expansions in one activity at the expense of another one.26
Finally, the “+”-codification was given to proposals that (i) improve public trans-
port or (ii) tax heavy vehicles. The latter choice is justified by the perspective of
the vast majority of voters who benefit from less freight transportation on roads, as
this allows them to move more freely on roads. Next, consider the TAX variable.
23We obtained the recommendations directly from those organisations.
24See the Appendix for more detailed information.
25For instance, this applies to a proposal to subject decisions on highway projects to a refer-
endum: Even though this might lead to restrictions on road building, we deemed this eﬀect too
vague to be considered here.
26The typical example would be the expansion of rail transport with simultaneous reduction in
road transport.
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A “−” was given to (i) most tax proposals and (ii) concrete proposals to extend
public transportation. The group where the variable TAX takes value “0” contains
the following types of proposals: (i) proposals which neither involve taxes nor sub-
sidies (e.g., driving restrictions on certain days, speed limits), (ii) proposals where
subsidies are to be reallocated between activities (conventional to organic farming,
road to rail), (iii) general procedural changes27, and (iv) heavy vehicle taxes.
The last decision was made because such taxes are not paid directly by the typical
voters.
4 Descriptive Statistics
We now provide some descriptive statistics.
4.1 Yes-Votes
Panel (i) of Figure 1 gives the percentage of yes-votes for each of the 45 ballots at
the national level, in the order in which the referenda took place. Two features
are interesting. First, there is considerable fluctuation in the data. Second, casual
inspection of the figure suggests an inverted U -shape for the yes-votes. In the time
period during which the first 35 elections took place (1977-1998), there seems to be
an upward trend. After that, there is a considerable decline: None of the last nine
proposals reached the 50%-level.
4.2 Environmental Preferences and Economic Parameters
Panels (ii)-(iv) of Figure 1 collect information on the development of economic para-
meters and environmental preferences. Panel (ii) shows that the percentage of Swiss
citizens who were eligible to vote and considered environmental problems as impor-
tant topic was between 70 and 80% until the late nineteen eighties. A decade later,
this percentage had fallen to about 20%. Panels (iii) and (iv) give the growth rate
of real national income and the unemployment rate at the national level.28 These
figures clearly suggest a close relation between deteriorating economic conditions
and the decreasing environmental awareness.
27Arguably, for instance, a proposal to subject highly subsidized nuclear power stations to more
complex planning projects might be expected to reduce subsidies, and hence taxes in the long-run.
We deemed this eﬀect to be too vague, however.
28The cantonal data exhibit similar patterns.
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Figure 1: Acceptance rates, environmental preferences and the two indicators re-
flecting economic conditions at the national level.
4.3 Cost Variables
Table 2 concerns the cost variables CS, TAX andBS. It summarizes the frequencies
with which each type of codification occurred. For instance, there are 19 propos-
als with neutral consumption and tax eﬀect (3 of which receive business support,
whereas 16 do not). The entries labeled “tax totals” give the number of proposals
with a particular tax eﬀect (e.g., there are 7 tax-neutral proposals with business sup-
port and 21 tax-neutral proposals that are not backed by the business association).
The entries in the column “consumption totals” have an analogous interpretation.
Note that there is considerable variation in the combinations of codifications
that arise: 11 diﬀerent combinations arise at least once; only one combination arises
more than five times.
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Tax Eﬀect → + 0 - Consumption
↓ Cons. Eﬀect totals
+ 0 (0) 3 (1) 3 (0) 6 (1)
0 0 (3) 3 (16) 2 (5) 5 (24)
- 0 (4) 1 (4) 0 (0) 1 (8)
Tax totals 0 (7) 7 (21) 5 (5) 12 (33)
Table 2: Breakdown of proposals with business support by consumption and tax
eﬀect (entries in brackets categorize proposals without business support).
5 Econometric Results
5.1 Overview
This section summarizes the regression results. First, we present four variants of
the model described above, which diﬀer only with respect to which independent
variables we included. We then sketch some robustness considerations.
All of our four main models include the consumption dummies CS0 and CS+, the
tax dummies TAX0 and TAX+, the business support variable BS, the population
density PD and the counterproposal dummy CP .
However, the four models diﬀer with respect to which economic parameters are
included. Model 1 contains the environmental preference variable ENV as well
as the real growth rates GROWTH and the unemployment rates UNEMP at
the cantonal level. We included this model in spite of strong concerns that multi-
collinearity makes the results hard to interpret. Because these concerns appear
justified, the remaining models restrict attention to a subset of these parameters.
Model 2 considers only the environmental preference variable ENV . In Model 3,
we use the economic parameters GROWTH and UNEMP , as one might expect
environmental preferences to be closely related to these economic quantities. Model
4 is similar, except that it uses the change in the unemployment rate in the preceding
year, ∆UNEMP , instead of unemployment rate itself.
5.2 The Main Results
Table 3 summarizes the results.
In all four models, the consumer sovereignty variables CS0 and CS+ have pos-
itive eﬀects, and these eﬀects are significant at the 1%-level. The interpretation is
straightforward. Voters (in their role as consumers) resent proposals that involve
a direct restriction in their freedom to choose certain consumption activities. On
12
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
CONST 8.1057*** 11.3996*** 23.9762*** 23.3137***
(1.6496) (1.4364) (1.4444) (1.4201)
CS0 13.2427*** 13.7055*** 16.9702*** 16.5989***
(0.9848) (0.9774) (1.0542) (1.0631)
CS+ 12.1454*** 12.7416*** 17.2919*** 16.1651***
(1.4297) (1.4320) (1.5349) (1.5606)
TAX0 −1.1027 −0.7555 0.2531 −0.8851
(0.8808) (0.8797) (0.9664) (0.9791)
TAX+ −0.8666 −0.4738 3.6228** 2.0743
(1.3379) (1.3348) (1.4415) (1.4865)
BS 21.0829*** 22.4538*** 20.5224*** 17.1020***
(1.0751) (1.0250) (1.1845) (1.1477)
ENV 0.3173*** 0.2687***
(0.0200) (0.0165)
GROWTH −0.0418 0.1239 0.4957***
(0.1279) (0.1405) (0.1425)
UNEMP 1.0994*** −1.2427***
(0.2683) (0.2467)
∆UNEMP 2.6136***
(0.5393)
PD 0.0028*** 0.0031*** 0.0034*** 0.0030***
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0004)
CP 16.8738*** 16.2826*** 11.3915*** 11.0258***
(1.0586) (1.0346) (1.1028) (1.1058)
Multiple R2 0.5528 0.5460 0.4561 0.4552
Notes: 1,170 observations in all specifications; * = Significant at the 10% level; ** = Significant
at the 5% level *** = Significant at the 1% level. Standard errors in parenthesis.
Table 3: OLS estimation results employing cantonal data. Dependent variable is
percentage of yes-votes.
the other hand, there is no substantial diﬀerence in the percentage of yes-votes
of projects that have no direct eﬀects on consumer sovereignty and projects that
expand it.
Also, the “general economic impact” captured by the business support variable
BS is as expected: Proposals with business support received significantly more
yes-votes (in all four models, this eﬀect is significant at the 1%-level). An inter-
pretation along the lines sketched in the introduction would work as follows. If a
project has the support of the business association, this is not necessarily only so be-
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cause it caters to special interests: There may well be at least a positive correlation
between business interests and general consumer interests. Put diﬀerently, if an en-
vironmental proposal has adverse economic eﬀects, so that the business association
recommends voting against it, some consumers may follow this recommendation for
fear of negative eﬀects on their own consumption, job situation, etc.
There is, however, another interpretation: The business association represents
the opinions of a particular group of voters (in particular, managers, owners and,
to some extent, workers of firms). In this sense, saying that a project has business
support amounts to very much the same as saying that there is a non-negligible
subset of voters that is likely to vote for a measure. Other things equal, proposals
that are supported by some group of society should receive more yes-votes. Never-
theless, this interpretation is not as convincing as it may seem. If it were true, it
should also hold with respect to other important groups in society. We checked this
by investigating the Social Democratic Party (SP) that usually obtains between 20
and 30% of the votes in parliamentary elections. It turns out that the SP supported
virtually all environmental proposals: Therefore, the SP recommendation bears es-
sentially no informational value about a proposal’s chances of success. Thus, our
alternative explanation of the impact of the business recommendation may not be
all that misleading.
The population density also confirms the expectations in all models. A higher
population density leads to a greater percentage of yes-votes (again, these eﬀects
are significant at the 1%-level in all four models). For instance, the eﬀect of increas-
ing the population density by 100 inhabitants per square kilometer on yes-votes is
estimated to lie between 0.28% (Model 1) and 0.34% (Model 4). To repeat, this is
consistent with a cost-benefit perspective: In cantons where population density is
high, the benefits of most environmental proposals are relatively high and the costs
are likely to be relatively low.
The tax variables TAX0 and TAX+ are usually insignificant. In cases where
the proposal itself is a tax this presumably reflects the fact that the tax levels are
typically not very high. In cases where the proposal is framed as support for some
public project, consumers may simply not be fully aware of the relation between the
project and possible tax increases.
To understand the influence of the remaining variables, a more careful distinc-
tion between the four models is called for. In Model 1, the eﬀect of ENV has the
expected sign and is significant. Surprisingly, GROWTH has a negative eﬀect on
the percentage of yes-votes, but this eﬀect is not significant. The eﬀect of UNEMP
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is positive and highly significant. We believe that these counterintuitive eﬀect reflect
the fact that there are too many explanatory variables in the model. Therefore, we
now consider the remaining models.
Model 2, which contains only ENV , gives the expected result: The eﬀect of
increasing environmental awareness is positive and highly significant, where a 10%
increase in environmental awareness raises the percentage of yes-votes by 2.7%.
Model 3, which contains only GROWTH and UNEMP instead of ENV also
yields plausible results: The unemployment rate has a significant negative eﬀect on
yes-votes. However, the eﬀect of a higher growth rates is positive but not significant.
Model 4 is like Model 3, except that∆UNEMP was chosen instead of UNEMP .
Here, the eﬀect of higher growth is positive and highly significant. Surprisingly,
∆UNEMP has a positive and highly significant eﬀects on yes-votes. Figure 1
suggests why this might be so. First, except for a very short period around 1990,
when unemployment increased dramatically, the unemployment rate was roughly
constant. Second, the critical period also happened to be a time during which many
referenda took place, which also received many yes-votes. Taking this together,
it seems that the counterintuitive eﬀect of increasing unemployment simply reflect
sluggish adjustment of actual voting behavior to the changes in economic conditions.
It is also worth taking a brief look at the constant term. In particular, we chose
our independent variables in Model 2 so that values of zero for these variables corre-
spond to the worst case for the referendum. The value of 11.4 for the constant term
can thus be interpreted as the percentage of voters in regions where the population
density is close to zero who vote for environmental proposals even when their con-
tents and the economic parameters at the time of the referendum make a yes-vote
particularly unattractive.
5.3 Robustness
We now discuss several critical issues that one might raise about our analysis. In each
case, we briefly report some related regression results suggesting that our original
analysis is not misleading.
5.3.1 Linearity
We related the percentage of yes-votes in a canton in a particular referendum to a
set of control variables using a model that is linear in its parameters. Obviously,
the predicted percentage of yes-votes obtained in this fashion could, in principle,
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lie outside the interval [0, 100] if the independent variables take extreme values.
A closer look at our regressions already suggests that this problem is not severe
under the specific circumstances. Consider Model 2, for example. As discussed
earlier, the minimum value for each independent variable is 0, which is also the
worst case for acceptance chances. The constant, which was estimated as 11.4, is
thus a lower bound for the percentage of yes-votes. On the other hand, take very
favorable conditions for acceptance: Consider a counterproposal that has business
support and does not restrict consumer sovereignty, at a time where environmental
preferences are at the maximum (78%), in a densely-populated canton (Canton of
Zurich). Even in this case, our estimation predicts an acceptance rate in the region
of 86%, which is well within the allowable range.
Even so, one might prefer using an alternative approach, for instance, by writing
the percentage of yes-votes as observed logits (that is, the natural logarithm of the
observed odds ratio) and regressing them on the same set of explanatory variables.
Re-estimating our model in this fashion led to similar results. In particular, the sign
of each coeﬃcient was unaltered and the significant variables in each model were
the same.
5.3.2 Heterogeneity of Proposals
Another potential problem concerns the heterogeneity of proposals in the sample.
In particular, the wide variety of topics addressed in the referenda which is only
partly reflected in our explanatory variables might lead to worries about the po-
tential influence of omitted variables. We dealt with this issue by carrying out our
regressions only for the transportation proposals, which should reduce the hetero-
geneity problems. In a qualitative sense, the results, which are not reported here,
are similar: The signs of the coeﬃcients essentially remain the same, and even the
quantitative diﬀerences in the values of the coeﬃcients are not extremely large.
5.3.3 Cantonal Data
We carried out one nation-wide regression with cantonal observations as data points.
Alternatively, we could have considered regressions where all observations refer to the
same geographical unit, for instance, the nation or one of the 26 cantons. Including
results from diﬀerent cantons in one regression is useful, because it allows us to
investigate the eﬀects of cantonal diﬀerences in the explanatory variables on the
outcome of the referendum. On the other hand, the independence assumption on
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error terms becomes problematic as geographical units cannot be assumed to be
independent draws from a large population. Even though we control for diﬀerences
in population density, it is still possible that specific cantonal eﬀects influence the
outcomes of diﬀerent referenda in similar ways.
Therefore, we also carried out one regression with only national variables. By
and large, the results are similar.29
6 Conclusions
This paper has identified determinants of success for environmental policy, using
referendum data for Swiss cantons. Two cost variables have pronounced negative
eﬀects: Restrictions on consumer sovereignty and a negative “general economic im-
pact”. The fact that a proposal contains a tax has no significant eﬀects on voter
behavior. Among the parameters describing the situation at the time of the referen-
dum, the environmental preference parameter has the expected eﬀect. An alternative
setting without the environmental preference variable, but with unemployment and
growth suggests that the unemployment eﬀect on yes-votes is negative, whereas the
growth eﬀect is positive.
There are several caveats to our analysis. First, some potentially important
variables have not been included. Most notably, there is no direct measure of the
environmental impact of a proposal. However, the eﬀects of population density at
least suggest that yes-votes and positive environmental eﬀects of proposals on the
population are closely related. Second, the use of dummy variables in cases where
cardinal variables would be desirable also means that influence factors that are
relevant from an economic point of view are not analyzed in full detail. However, the
fact that we obtain some explanatory value despite our crude independent variables
is promising. Third, our analysis treats the policy proposals as exogenous variables.
To some extent, however, they should depend on other variables of our model:
For instance, when environmental concern is low, proposals are unlikely to be very
ambitious. This eﬀects suggests that our analysis is likely to underestimate the
29There is one important diﬀerence, however. In Model 3, the sign of the unemployment coeﬃcent
switches, with higher unemployment corresponding to more yes-votes. This counterintuitive eﬀect
becomes understandable by comparison with the cantonal regression. There, the variation in the
unemployment rate is regional as well as temporal. In the national model, however, the variation
is only temporal. Thus, the high concentration of referenda with large numbers of yes-votes is in
the early years of high unemployment is likely to have a stronger eﬀect on the outcome than in
the regressions with cantonal data.
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eﬀects of environmental preferences.30 Fourth, the use of the recommendation of
the business association for the “general economic impact” is worth mentioning:
Though we believe that our interpretation of the variable is not entirely oﬀ the
mark, we realize that this point is debatable.
Given the limitations of our approach, we hesitate to draw far-reaching con-
clusions. One important aspect seems to transpire, however. The widely held be-
lief that market instruments find acceptance less easily than command-and-control
regulation must be taken with a grain of salt. At least when consumers decide
about proposals to restrict emissions from consumption, they are reluctant to ac-
cept a command-and-control regulation. Taxes seem to meet with less resistance.31
Strictly speaking, this observation is not in contradiction with standard political
economy arguments that taxes face greater resistance than standards. First, we
should emphasize that proposals with taxes include not only environmental taxes,
but also subsidized public projects that are expected to lead to tax payments. Sec-
ond, standard arguments usually refer to pollution by firms, whereas many of the
investigated proposals deal with consumption emissions (mostly by motorists). Our
analysis suggests that the political economy of consumption emissions may diﬀer
substantially from the political economy of production emissions. An alternative in-
terpretation is also plausible: Casual observations suggest that, whereas some of the
proposed command-and-control measures were massive interventions, the proposed
taxes tended to be fairly low. Had voters been confronted with the typical textbook
exercise of comparing a command-and-control measure with a tax with equivalent
emission eﬀects, they might have preferred command-and-control measures.
Finally, we would like to emphasize that our paper does not provide a normative
analysis. In particular, the fact that certain types of command-and-control regu-
lation seem to meet with more resistance than other instruments does not in itself
mean that they should not be applied. In cases where alternative policy options
are limited, it may well be a wise move to put such instruments on the political
agenda, even at the risk of failure. Nevertheless, our results remind us that it may
be worth thinking very hard about the way in which environmental goals are tar-
geted, not only for eﬃciency reasons: To sell environmental policy, it is important
30Also, treating proposals as endogeneous leads to a mild reinterpretation of the significant
positive constant in our regression: It suggests that proposals are chosen so that a substantial
baseline support exists.
31Arguably, direct democracy might play a rule in generating these results. Elected politicians
might be willing to impose restrictions on consumer sovereignty even when consumers would not
accept such a proposal.
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not to destroy the goodwill of the buyers.
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Appendix: List of Proposals
No. Date Content CS TAX BS ENV %Y ES
1 25/09/77 Pollution standards for mo-
tor vehicles
0 0 − 74 39.0
2 26/03/78 Possibility for optional refer-
endum on highway projects
0 0 − 74 38.7
3 28/05/78 Prohibition of driving on 12
Sundays per year
− 0 − 74 36.3
4 18/02/79 More restrictive conditions
for approval of nuclear power
plants
0 0 − 73 48.8
5 20/05/79 Slightly more restrictive con-
ditions for approval of nu-
clear power plants
0 0 − 73 68.9
6 27/02/83 Measures to reduce energy
consumption
0 0 + 71 50.9
7 26/02/84 Highway usage fee 0 − − 71 53.0
8 23/09/84 Measures to reduce energy
consumption and support re-
newable energy usage; incl.
energy tax
0 − − 71 45.8
9 23/09/84 Prohibition of new nuclear
plants
0 + − 71 45.0
10 07/12/86 Heavy-vehicle tax + 0 − 73 33.9
11 06/12/87 Landscape preservation
measures
0 0 − 78 57.8
12 06/12/87 Extension of rail transport + − + 78 57.0
13 12/06/88 General redirection of trans-
portation policy towards
public transport
0 0 − 74 45.5
Table A.1: Detailed information about the content of each proposal, codification
decisions, environmental preferences at the time of the vote and the percentage of
yes-votes.
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No. Date Content CS TAX BS ENV %Y ES
14 01/04/90 General restrictions on road
building
− + − 70 28.5
15 01/04/90 Proposal not to build a mo-
torway (N1)
− + − 70 32.7
16 01/04/90 Proposal not to build a mo-
torway (N4)
− + − 70 31.4
17 01/04/90 Proposal not to build a mo-
torway (N5)
− + − 70 34.0
18 23/09/90 General, non-specific pro-
posal to reduce energy con-
sumption
0 0 − 70 71.0
19 23/09/90 Ten-Year Moratorium on nu-
clear power plants
0 + − 70 54.6
20 23/09/90 More stringent restrictions
on nuclear power plants
0 0 − 70 47.1
21 03/03/91 Redirection of subsidies from
road to rail transport
0 0 − 61 37.2
22 03/03/91 Preservation of rivers and
lakes
0 0 − 61 37.1
23 17/05/92 Preservation of rivers and
lakes
0 0 − 50 66.1
24 27/09/92 Large-scale rail projects
(incl. trans-alpine tunnels)
+ − + 50 63.6
25 07/03/93 Gasoline Tax Increase 0 − + 47 54.5
26 06/06/93 Restrictions on the military
usage of landscape
0 0 − 47 44.7
27 20/02/94 Road usage fee (prolonga-
tion)
0 − + 47 68.5
28 20/02/94 Heavy vehicle tax (prolonga-
tion)
+ 0 + 47 72.2
29 20/02/94 Milage-based heavy vehicle
tax
+ 0 + 47 67.1
Table A.1: Continued.
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No. Date Content CS TAX BS ENV %Y ES
30 20/02/94 Measures to move freight
transportation in the Alps
from road to rail an restric-
tions on road building
0 0 − 47 51.9
31 12/03/95 Constitutional support for
organic farming
0 0 + 31 50.8
32 09/06/96 Redirection of subsidies
from conventional to organic
farming
0 0 + 20 77.6
33 07/06/98 Restrictions on GM food − 0 + 19 33.3
34 27/09/98 Redirections of subsidies
from conventional to organic
farming
0 0 − 19 77.0
35 27/09/98 Mileage-based heavy-vehicle
charge (Details)
+ 0 + 19 57.2
36 29/11/98 Financing Proposal for Rail-
way Infrastructure in the
Alps
+ − + 19 63.5
37 12/03/00 Proposal to reduce private
road transportation by 50%
in 10 years
− 0 − 25 18.1
38 24/09/00 Tax on renewable energy;
subsidies for solar energy
0 − − 25 31.9
39 24/09/00 Tax on renewable energy;
subsidies for solar energy
(more moderate than 38)
0 − − 25 46.6
40 24/09/00 Energy tax 0 − − 25 44.6
41 04/03/01 Speed limit in towns (30
km/h)
− 0 − 15 20.3
42 02/12/01 Taxation of Energy instead
of Labor
0 0 − 15 22.9
43 18/05/03 Prohibition of driving on 4
per year
− 0 − 14 37.6
Table A.1: Continued.
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No. Date Content CS TAX BS ENV %Y ES
44 18/05/03 Proposal to abandon nu-
clear energy gradually
0 0 − 14 33.7
45 18/05/03 Prolongation of the mora-
torium on nuclear power
plants
0 + − 14 41.6
Table A.1: Continued.
Explanation:
(i) The column “CS” refers to consumer sovereignty: The sign “−” corresponds
to proposals with a direct negative impact on a particular activity (CS+ =
0; CS0 = 0); “0” corresponds to proposals with no direct impact (CS+ =
0; CS0 = 1); “+” corresponds to proposals with a positive impact (CS+ =
1; CS0 = 0).
(ii) The column “TAX” refers to tax eﬀects: The sign “−” corresponds to pro-
posals that increase the tax burden (TAX0 = 0; TAX+ = 0); “0” corresponds
to proposals with no direct impact on taxes (TAX0 = 1; TAX+ = 0); “+”
corresponds to proposals that lower the tax burden (TAX0 = 0; TAX+ = 1).
(iii) The column “BS” refers to the recommendation of the business association:
A “+” corresponds to proposals that were endorsed by economiesuisse and
its predecessors (IS=“1”); a minus corresponds to proposals that were not
backed.
(iv) The column “ENV ” refers to environemental preferences and gives the mea-
sure of environmental preferences when the vote took place.
(v) The column “%Y ES” gives the percentage of yes-votes.
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